Next, we have this look at the Nasdaq/SPX ratio from Mike Panzner. Mike thinks this intriguing relationship is back to prior high levels:

A basic piracy operation requires a minimum eight to twelve militia prepared to stay at sea for extended periods of time, in the hopes of hijacking a passing vessel. Each team requires a minimum of two attack skiffs, weapons, equipment, provisions, fuel and preferably a supply boat. The costs of the operation are usually borne by investors, some of whom may also be pirates.

To be eligible for employment as a pirate, a volunteer should already possess a firearm for use in the operation. For this ‘contribution’, he receives a ‘class A’ share of any profit. Pirates who provide a skiff or a heavier firearm, like an RPG or a general purpose machine gun, may be entitled to an additional A-share. The first pirate to board a vessel may also be entitled to an extra A-share.

At least 12 other volunteers are recruited as militiamen to provide protection on land of a ship is hijacked, In addition, each member of the pirate team may bring a partner or relative to be part of this land-based force. Militiamen must possess their own weapon, and receive a ‘class B’ share — usually a fixed amount equivalent to approximately US$15,000.

If a ship is successfully hijacked and brought to anchor, the pirates and the militiamen require food, drink, qaad, fresh clothes, cell phones, air time, etc. The captured crew must also be cared for. In most cases, these services are provided by one or more suppliers, who advance the costs in anticipation of reimbursement, with a significant margin of profit, when ransom is eventually paid.

When ransom is received, fixed costs are the first to be paid out. These are typically:

• Reimbursement of supplier(s)

• Financier(s) and/or investor(s): 30% of the ransom

• Local elders: 5 to 10 %of the ransom (anchoring rights)

• Class B shares (approx. $15,000 each): militiamen, interpreters etc.

The remaining sum — the profit — is divided between class-A shareholders.

Let me make clear what I am saying and what I am not saying on the role of Germany in the eurozone and the eurozone in the world.

I am not saying Germany is at fault for making first-rate manufactured products. It is an admirable achievement. I am not saying Germany should make its workers uncompetitive or accept much higher inflation, either.

I am saying that Germany’s surpluses were made possible by other countries’ deficits, and so German stability by other countries' instability. I am saying that part of Germany’s net exports were illusory, paid for by excessive borrowing, often financed by Germans. I am saying that if peripheral Europe is to improve its external accounts, either Germany must offset some part of this, or the current account of the eurozone itself must shift towards surplus, with adverse impacts on the fragile world economy.

In short, economic policy is about more than competitiveness. When the world is trying to struggle out of a deep recession, demand matters, too. As the world’s fourth-largest economy and the core of the eurozone, Germany has a role to play in rebalancing global demand. I appreciate that this is a difficult challenge. It must be met, all the same.

By “success”, I mean reignition of the credit engine in high-income deficit countries. So private sector spending surges anew, fiscal deficits shrink and the economy appears to being going back to normal, at last. By “failure” I mean that the deleveraging continues, private spending fails to pick up with any real vigour and fiscal deficits remain far bigger, for far longer, than almost anybody now dares to imagine. This would be post-bubble Japan on a far wider scale.

Unhappily, the result of what I call success would probably be a still bigger financial crisis in future, while the results of what I call failure would be that the fiscal rope would run out, even though reaching the end might take longer than worrywarts fear. Yet the big point is that either outcome ultimately leads us to a sovereign debt crisis. This, in turn, would surely result in defaults, probably via inflation. In essence, stretched balance sheets threaten mass private sector bankruptcy and a depression, or sovereign bankruptcy and inflation, or some combination of the two.

I can envisage two ways by which the world might grow out of its debt overhangs without such a collapse: a surge in private and public investment in the deficit countries or a surge in demand from the emerging countries. Under the former, higher future income would make today’s borrowing sustainable. Under the latter, the savings generated by the deleveraging private sectors of deficit countries would flow naturally into increased investment in emerging countries.

Lets back out AAPL's $45 in cash. That leaves it at $180. They are going to earn $15 (its the high estimate but they've massively beaten estimates for the past 4 qtrs). Thats only 12x earnings. thats the same as WMT despite much faster revenue growth (30% vs 6%). On the basis of the numbers alone why shouldn't AAPL be worth more than WMT?

zanimivo (v komentarjih) o Applu